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1.  Introduction and main issues
The introduction of the euro and the strengthening of 
the co-ordination of economic policies in the European 
Union (EU) are fuelling a reﬂ  ection on the representation 
of Europe in the international ﬁ  nancial institutions. Both 
in Europe and elsewhere, calls are mounting for European 
position taking and representation in international fora to 
be streamlined, a process which could end in a single EU 
representation, as in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
The issue has received much attention at the European 
Convention, and is – at least in the view of many current 
member states of the Union – a long - term objective.
In the light of the establishment of a single monetary 
policy, the question of a single external EU representation 
is of particular relevance with regard to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which is at the core of the inter-
national ﬁ  nancial system. Through its almost world-wide 
membership, the surveillance which it exerts over its 
members’ policies, and the assistance and conditional 
emergency ﬁ   nancing which it provides, the Fund is a 
major instrument contributing to macroeconomic and 
ﬁ  nancial stability.
The establishment of a single EU representation would 
constitute an historical change in the IMF membership, 
and would raise major governance issues in various 
ﬁ   elds. While this exploratory article focuses on gov-
ernance issues raised with regard to the IMF itself, it 
also touches upon the possible impact on the internal 
functioning of the Union, and “spill  -  over effects” 
for the governance of other international ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and fora.
These issues have to be approached within the perspec-
tive of the ongoing, broad debate on the governance of 
the Fund. With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
of ﬁ  xed exchange rates in the early seventies, the Fund 
had lost its core function with regard to balance of pay-
ments crises, and thereby also – in the eyes of many – its 
raison d’être. The institution has nevertheless come back 
to the foreground, in particular as an instrument for the 
prevention and resolution of ﬁ  nancial  crises.  However, 
since the succession of crises in the nineties, which were 
primarily capital account driven, the effectiveness of the 
Fund’s surveillance and its governance have been increas-
ingly questioned. Basically, the Fund has been under 
criticism for being insufﬁ  ciently transparent, independent 
and accountable  (1). The organisation was able to react 
positively to many of the reproaches made ; the progresses 
realised with regard to transparency are illustrative in this 
ﬁ  eld.
It follows from the analysis developed in this article that 
the creation of a single EU chair may affect two of the 
major controversies still in the forefront in this respect  : 
excessive politicisation of the Fund’s decision  -  making, 
and unbalanced representation of its members.
First, critics point to what is seen as the current dispropor-
tional inﬂ  uence over Fund decision-making of the Fund 
staff on the one hand, and of the Group of Seven (G7) 
on the other. The G7  countries are believed to bring 
into the IMF decision-making process their own geopo-
litical considerations, which can be at odds with sound 
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governance of the institution. While many acknowledge 
that political considerations are difﬁ  cult to discard when 
deciding whether or not to provide Fund ﬁ  nancing, it is 
often stressed that the IMF’s surveillance activities should 
be exerted in a more objective and independent way. 
From the analysis below it follows that establishing a 
single EU chair may, on the one hand, provide a counter-
vailing power for the perceived imbalances. On the other 
hand, it could also further exacerbate the trend towards 
polarisation in IMF governance, as the result could be a 
duopoly at the head of (the G7 and) the IMF, the ability 
of which to provide real leadership remains to be demon-
strated. It will be further argued that the extent to which 
the EU will be willing and able to deﬁ  ne a common exter-
nal policy could be crucial in this respect.
A second criticism addressed to the IMF is the insufﬁ  cient 
voice, both in terms of voting power and in terms of 
number of Executive Directors (EDs), given to emerging 
economies and developing countries, while industrialised 
countries, and Europe in particular, are deemed to beneﬁ  t 
from excessive inﬂ  uence. In this respect, the establishment 
of a single EU chair could provide a window of opportunity 
for bringing the actual quotas in the Fund more in line with 
newly calculated quotas. The quota of the EU chair could 
indeed be set signiﬁ  cantly below the sum of the actual 
quotas of the EU member states, and there might be a 
quite fundamental reallocation of quotas and EDs among 
the Fund membership. A single EU chair might involve 
the interesting paradox that a reduction in the number of 
European EDs, in the global voting power of Europe and 
in its contribution to the Fund’s general resources could go 
hand in hand with an increase in the Union’s impact on IMF 
decision-making.
A single EU chair would also affect the co-operative nature 
of the Fund. Originally, this nature was underpinned by the 
possibility for each member to become both a Fund credi-
tor and a Fund debtor, depending on the member’s needs. 
Over the years, the relative economic development of IMF 
members has led to a growing separation between creditor 
and debtor countries. Nevertheless, EU countries, through 
their involvement in mixed constituencies, have so far miti-
gated the potential detrimental effects on the co-operative 
nature of the IMF of too strong a division between creditor 
and debtor chairs. The number and impact of mixed con-
stituencies in the Fund could, however, be reduced signiﬁ  -
cantly by the establishment of a single EU chair.
Whatsoever, the emergence of a single EU chair at the IMF 
would inevitably entail a fundamental and comprehensive 
debate on the governance of that institution. Much, 
however, will also depend on the way in which such an 
EU chair would be set up, which in turn hinges on the 
future internal governance of the Union. In this respect 
also, this contribution can only be a ﬁ  rst exploratory exer-
cise, the conclusions remaining very tentative due to the 
many political imponderabilia.
A political willingness of the Member States will undoubt-
edly be a vital prerequisite for the process to be set in 
motion. After that, the effective impact will very much 
depend on the governance of the EU chair itself (i.e. the 
way in which its positions are determined, and, more 
broadly, how its functioning is organised). It can be 
argued that a common EU foreign policy constitutes a 
prerequisite for the single EU chair to be able to perform 
an effective leading role in the decision-making process 
at the IMF. However, as is reﬂ  ected by the current debate 
within the European Convention, a unique EU member-
ship at the IMF might be arranged before a binding con-
sensus is reached on the establishment of a common for-
eign policy. EU positions at the Fund should then be pre-
pared either through co-ordination mechanisms between 
national authorities (which already function today, be it
– evidently – within a different framework, the Fund 
remaining a country-based institution), or via a more 
independent EU institution (existing or newly created).
The conclusion is that a single EU chair, by affecting pro-
foundly the balance of power at the Fund and through 
its inextricable links with the internal governance of the 
Union, will inevitably lead to a further and comprehensive 
debate on the governance of the international ﬁ  nancial 
system. What can be seen as a positive step on the long 
road to further European integration, will undoubtedly 
have major implications extending far beyond the borders 
of the Union, and the functioning of the IMF as such. 
Hence, the European Union has to consider carefully all 
the implications of possible actions in this ﬁ  eld.
*
*      *
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In 
a second chapter we analyse the potential impact of 
a single EU chair on the IMF members’ quota shares. 
Chapter 3 examines the possible impact of a single EU 
chair on IMF ﬁ   nances, in particular the Fund’s liquidity 
position, access to Fund ﬁ  nancing, and Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR) allocations. Chapter 4 then focuses on the 
potential consequences for the governance of the IMF, 
assessing the impact on the decision-making process at 
the IMF and the importance of the EU internal governance 
in this process. Some legal issues are touched upon in 
chapter 5, while chapter 6 considers the impact on other 
international organisations.175
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2.  Considerations on Fund quotas
Each country’s capital subscription to the Fund is referred 
to as the country’s IMF quota. A member’s quota is at the 
core of its relations with the Fund. In addition to ﬁ  xing 
its contribution to the general resources of the IMF, a 
member’s quota determines its voting power  (2), affects 
its borrowing capacity and determines its part in the 
allocation of SDR.
2.1  Historical evolution of quota allocations
At the Bretton Woods negotiations in 1944, the quota 
question was central and highly political. America’s main 
negotiator, the US Treasury chief international economist 
(and later ﬁ   rst US ED) Harry Dexter White, took the 
position that the aggregate voting power of the British 
Commonwealth as determined by the quotas should not 
exceed the quota share of the US (36.2 p.c.). The UK, 
represented by its chief negotiator John Maynard Keynes, 
got a large quota; it ranked second with 17.1 p.c. France 
was  “given” a quota totalling one  -  third of the UK’s. 
European countries such as Germany, Italy and Spain were 
not invited to the conference.
Over the years, many members have acceded to the 
Fund, while some others have withdrawn – sometimes 
temporarily –, such as Cuba, Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
The Fund grew from a club with 44 countries to a world 
association of 184  members. Currently, only Andorra, 
Cuba, Liechtenstein, North Korea and some island- and 
city-states have not (yet) joined.
It is difﬁ   cult to draw lessons from the history of the 
Fund for the process of the establishment of a single EU 
chair. One could refer to the division of Czechoslovakia 
and Ethiopia, on which occasions the new countries  (3) 
together received a larger quota than the original quota 
of the country they replaced. But the most relevant expe-
rience may be the case of the United Arab Republic. In 
1958, Syria and Egypt merged politically and informed 
the Managing Director that they wanted to become a 
single member of the IMF “with a single quota and sub-
ject to the provisions of its Articles”. The Executive Board 
took a pragmatic approach towards this request, ﬁ  nding 
it unnecessary for the Board of Governors “to adopt a 
membership resolution establishing terms that had been 
laid down already and requiring actions, such as the pay-
ment of subscriptions and the agreement on par value, 
that had been taken already”. The new member inherited 
the sum of the quota of Syria and Egypt, but only got 
the basic votes of a single member. Joseph Gold (1974) 
notes that the Fund continued to “hold the currencies of 
the two regions, have separate depositories in Cairo and 
Damascus for the currencies, deal through two ﬁ  scal agen-
cies, make separate calculations of monetary reserves for 
the purpose of repurchase obligations and conduct sepa-
rate consultations”. At the end of 1961, Syria requested 
reinstatement of its Fund membership and original quota. 
Again, the Executive Board accepted the request.
The Syrian-Egyptian case is interesting, as the merger was 
instigated by the political will of two IMF members, to 
which the Fund formulated a very pragmatic response. 
However, it does not constitute a real precedent for the 
uniﬁ  cation  of  Europe’s representation in the Fund. The 
number of countries and the importance of the econo-
mies involved in the latter process make the economic, 
political and legal issues at stake much more complex.
2.2  The establishment of a single EU quota
A single EU chair could be set up in various ways. In a ﬁ  rst 
scenario, all EU countries could remain Fund members 
individually, while being grouped in a single EU constitu-
ency. Or, as in the United Arab Republic case, there might 
be a single EU chair that would take over the actual 
quotas of the countries it replaces, but with the basic 
votes of a single member. Both possibilities would imply 
a status quo for the actual quota shares of all other IMF 
members, while the EU chair would inherit a vast voting 
power. Bini - Smaghi (2003) however considers a single EU 
constituency with an adapted quota share.
In a second scenario, the EU could become a “fully 
ﬂ  edged” single member, for which a new “fully ﬂ  edged 
and single” quota would need to be established. The 
starting point for the determination of a Fund mem-
ber’s quota is its calculated quota. This number is the 
outcome of ﬁ  ve speciﬁ  c formulas, based on economic 
variables related to the different functions that quotas 
perform. First, a country’s potential contribution to the 
IMF’s general resources is determined by its economic 
size, its foreign reserves and the strength of its balance 
of payments position. Second, the quota formulas are 
intended to reﬂ  ect a country’s economic and ﬁ  nancial 
impact on the rest of the world. Third, as quotas also 
determine normal access limits to Fund ﬁ  nancing, the 
formulas relate to the potential borrowing needs of a 
country, in turn a function of the size of the country, its 
openness and current account imbalances, the variability 
of its receipts, and the amount of its reserves.
(2)  For the moment, 97.87 p.c. of voting power depends on quotas and 2.13 p.c. on 
basic votes, which are identical for all members.
(3)  Respectively the Czech and the Slovak Republic, Ethiopia and Eritrea.176
Recomputing Calculated Quotas
The actual quota shares of the IMF members were lastly adapted on the basis of calculated quotas computed for 
the eleventh general review of quotas (CQ11)  (1). However, due among other things to the primacy of equipropor-
tional adjustments (distributed to all members according to their existing, actual quota shares) in general quota 
reviews, there still exist relatively substantial differences between the calculated and actual quotas.
We have computed new calculated quota shares (NCQS) for the option under which a new single quota would be 
attributed to the EU chair, representing the current ﬁ  fteen member states of the Union. Our computations are based 
upon the ﬁ  ve existing quota formulas and use the data from the most recent (twelfth) quota review. Although there 
have been in recent (and earlier) years many discussions on a revision of the current quota formulas, it is very likely 
that any potential future alternative formula will still largely be based on GDP and balance of payments data.
The ﬁ  rst columns of the chart show the calculated quotas (CQ11) as they were computed for the eleventh quota 
review for the largest members and for various relevant groups of countries. The second columns indicate the 
actual quota shares of these members (Actual), which for various, technical and political, reasons differ from the 
CQ11. The third columns give the new calculated quota shares (NCQS).
It appears from our computations that the EU chair and the US have a very similar new calculated quota share  (2). 
This mainly follows from a downward adjustment of the single EU quota share, as compared to the aggregate 
quota share of the ﬁ  fteen EU countries, largely due to the exclusion of the current account ﬂ  ows among the EU 
members from the computations. Every non-EU country gains a part of the difference. In addition, the recent rela-
tive economic development of the Fund members also plays a role in the adjustment, as the NCQS are based on 
more recent economic data than the data underlying the current quotas. While these effects may be substantial 
for some emerging countries, for European economies they are almost negligible at present, as the recent growth 
rate of this group of countries is relatively close to the world average growth rate.
Box 1
(1)  The eleventh and twelfth general quota reviews were respectively closed in 1997 and 2002 and based on 1982-1994 and 1987-1999 data. The eleventh review led 
to an adaptation of actual quotas, the twelfth did not.
(2)  Note that our calculated quotas are different from the ones calculated by the Quota Formula Review Group (QFRG) or Cooper Report (IMF (2001 b)). This QFRG was 
an external panel of experts, chaired by Professor Richard Cooper, which was commissioned by the IMF in 1999 to submit an independent report on the adequacy of 
the quota formulas and to make proposals on a formula which would more closely reﬂ  ect members’ relative positions in the world economy as well as their ability to 
contribute to, and their need for, IMF resources. This group found a calculated quota share for the EU-15 of 28 p.c., much larger than the US quota of 19.6 p.c., as 
it only excluded intra-EU trade in goods. It did not exclude other current account ﬂ  ows (services, income and current transfers), as we did.
The quota calculations for a single EU chair would logi-
cally be based on data for the EU as a whole, excluding 
intra-EU ﬂ  ows. The outcome of these calculations, in per 
cent of total Fund quotas, will be smaller than the sum of 
the former individual (calculated and actual) quota shares 
of the EU member states. It should be kept in mind that 
any change in the EU quota share logically and inevitably 
entails a change in the quota shares of the other IMF 
members.
If and when the European quota share is adapted   / 
reduced towards its new calculated quota share, the 
other IMF members will gain a part of the difference. 
This redistribution could be done in an equiproportional 
way, according to existing actual quotas. However, the 
adaptation of the EU quota share might also trigger 
a general reshufﬂ  e, with the quota shares of all IMF 
members being adapted towards their new calculated 
quota shares.177
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Between the “status quo” option (one EU constituency) 
and a full alignment of actual quota shares with calcu-
lated quota shares, there are many scenarios. History 
shows that on the sometimes-long road from calculated 
quota to actual quota, political considerations play an 
important role. There is a very strong probability that 
such considerations will play an equally prominent role 
in deciding the voting power of a single EU chair. Speciﬁ  c 
points concerning that topic will be discussed at a later 
stage, in chapter 4.
In case a single EU chair is created, a complete status quo 
seems politically very improbable, since this would imply 
an EU quota share twice as large as the quota share of 
the second largest IMF member, being the US. A single EU 
chair could thus conceivably lead to a certain convergence 
between the EU and US quotas. Both members would 
even have very similar quotas, if it would be agreed to 
stick closely to new calculated quota shares.
Before looking further into the governance implications for 
the Fund, more technical consequences with respect to IMF 
ﬁ  nancing may be derived from the previous exercise.
The outcomes of our computations would not be affected signiﬁ  cantly by the enlargement of the Union. Ten coun-
tries will accede to the EU in May 2004, plus Bulgaria and Romania probably in 2007, while Turkey could begin 
negotiations towards accession in 2004. The consequences of the potential inclusion of these thirteen countries 
in the EU chair are rather minor, due to their relatively limited economic weight in comparison with the current EU 
members, and to their close trade links with the Union  (3). The EU chair would still have a calculated quota relatively 
comparable to that of the US.
QUOTA OF IMF MEMBERS
(3)  The calculated quota share of the EU chair would increase by less than 3.5 percentage points when including these thirteen countries. However, these percentages 
overestimate the quota share of the enlarged EU chair, as we have not subtracted the current account ﬂ  ows of these members from and to the other EU members, 



















Sources : IMF, NBB.
CQ11 are the calculated quota shares computed for the eleventh quota review and based on 1982 - 1994 data.
































































































































































































3.  Potential impact on Fund ﬁ  nances
The reshufﬂ  ing of actual quotas that a single EU chair 
could bring about, will inevitably have consequences for 
IMF  ﬁ   nances, in particular for the liquidity position of 
the Fund, the access to its ﬁ  nancing and SDR holdings 
and allocations. We assess the potential impact in these 
ﬁ  elds by assuming that the nominal amount of total Fund 
quotas remains unchanged and is not affected by the 
creation of the single EU chair  (4).
3.1  The liquidity position of the IMF
Quota subscriptions represent the overwhelming part of 
the IMF general resources. As these resources are not all 
available immediately – only currencies issued by members 
with strong enough external payments positions are quali-
ﬁ  ed as usable –, the Fund establishes a ﬁ  nancial transac-
tions plan for each quarterly period, in order to manage 
its usable resources. It thereby selects the currencies to 
be used in transactions and allocates the ﬁ  nancing of the 
transactions among members included in the plan. These 
members are selected on the basis of an assessment by the 
Executive Board of the strength of their external position 
(i.e. sufﬁ   ciently strong balance of payments and reserve 
position). The participation of members aims to be broad, 
in order to reﬂ  ect the co-operative nature of the Fund and 
to maximise the liquidity of its resources.
There are currently (March 2003) 44 members included in 
the ﬁ  nancial transactions plan, among which are the ﬁ  f-
teen current EU members and ﬁ  ve EU acceding countries. 
A reduction in the quota of EU members would dimin-
ish the usable resources of the IMF if, as is currently the 
case, an attempt were made to balance the members’ 
participation in transactions in proportion to their quotas. 
However, such a reduction would be partially compen-
sated by the increase in the quota of other members, 
some of which are currently major contributors to Fund 
resources, such as Japan and the US.
The actual reserve positions in the Fund  (5) of the cur-
rent  ﬁ   fteen EU members amount to SDR 25.5  billion, 
representing on average 39.5 p.c. of their quota. If the 
contribution of each participant in the ﬁ  nancial transac-
tions plan is kept constant in proportion to its quota  but 
each member’s actual quota is set equal to its NCQS, the 
reduction of the EU quota would diminish the resources 
available to the IMF by SDR 7.1  billion. This would, 
however, be more than compensated by the increase 
in the quota of the other 29 members included in the 
ﬁ   nancial transactions plan (increase of SDR 12  billion). 
On the other hand, if the members’ reserve positions 
in the Fund were set uniformly at the current average
proportion of all members concerned (32.94  p.c. of 
quota), the IMF usable resources would be reduced by 
SDR 10.2 billion due to the change in the EU quota share, 
but increased by SDR 4.9 billion due to the adjustment of 
the other members’ quota share.
Another way of increasing the IMF’s usable resources 
might be for the list of sufﬁ  ciently strong members to be 
extended. Members who, at the time of establishment of 
the single chair, have experienced a sufﬁ  cient, sustainable 
improvement in their balance of payments and reserve 
position could then be included.
3.2  Access to Fund ﬁ  nancing
Quotas also determine the amount of ﬁ  nancing members 
can obtain from the IMF under “normal” circumstances. 
Currently, annual and cumulative ceilings for access limits to 
IMF resources are set at 100 p.c. and 300 p.c. of quota  (6). In 
addition, conditionality and interest surcharges applied under 
the two facilities with explicit access limits increase with the 
amount of outstanding credit, in order to discourage sub-
stantial and prolonged use of IMF resources. A modiﬁ  cation 
of the quota shares of countries would hence have implica-
tions for the amount of ﬁ  nancing they can obtain from the 
IMF under normal circumstances, as well as affect the condi-
tions, eligibility criteria and costs of these borrowings.
In recent years, emerging markets have relied on exten-
sive Fund ﬁ  nancing (between 1995-2002, the group of 
emerging markets beneﬁ  ted from 26 IMF packages, ten 
of which were beyond normal access limits). An increase 
in the actual quotas of this group towards the level of 
their NCQS would have some impact on the cost of the 
resources borrowed. For example, the outstanding credit 
of Turkey would represent a much smaller share of its 
quota based on the NCQS than is currently the case, while 
the contrary would apply to Argentina and Uruguay.
As far as the EU countries are concerned, the question of 
access to IMF ﬁ  nancing is likely to be of decreasing rel-
evance. First, even if France was the ﬁ  rst IMF borrower and 
the UK is still among the largest borrowers in the history 
(4)  The establishment of a single EU chair as such would not affect the potential 
ﬁ  nancing needs of the Fund membership, nor the level of Fund resources deemed 
appropriate to cover these.
(5)  The reserve position of a member is a liquid claim on the IMF received by this 
member for the reserve assets that it has contributed to the IMF. The use of a 
member’s currency in a transfer, i.e. a purchase by another member in exchange 
for an equivalent amount of its own currency, increases the former member’s 
reserve position in the Fund.
(6)  Facilities including access limits are the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) and the 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Financial assistance above these statutory limits can, 
however, be granted through two alternative avenues, i.e. the exceptional circum-
stances clause or the two facilities that are not subject to statutory limits – the 
Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) and the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL). 179
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of the IMF  (7) (Chart 1), the current members of the EU are 
unlikely to rely on IMF ﬁ  nancing in the foreseeable future. 
Indeed, they are all net creditors of the IMF, the majority of 
them having not borrowed from the Fund since 1970. Italy, 
the UK, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Finland still received 
loans from the IMF in the 1980s. The last EU country to 
have borrowed from IMF resources was Portugal in 1987. 
Second, among the acceding countries, only Latvia and 
Lithuania are currently IMF debtors; the three accession 
countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, are in the same 
position. The likelihood of these countries requesting IMF 
ﬁ  nancing is called to decrease further with the convergence 
process and their accession to the EU.
3.3  The future of SDR
Quotas also determine each member’s share in an 
allocation of SDR. Until now, the total allocation of SDR 
amounts to SDR 21.4 billion  (8), 33.7 p.c. of which being 
attributed to the current members of the European Union 
(representing SDR 7.3 billion)  (9). In addition to holding a 
substantial share of SDR, EU members actively participate 
in the SDR market and contribute greatly to its liquidity. 
Among the thirteen countries or institutions  (10) which 
have concluded a two-way arrangement, allowing the 
IMF to conduct voluntary transactions in SDR within 
speciﬁ   c limits, on behalf of the members and without 
their preliminary agreement, eight are EU countries. The 
current (October 2002) holdings of SDR by EU members 
represent 55 p.c. of their net cumulative allocation.
With the creation of a single EU chair, a decision would 
need to be taken regarding the existing SDR of the EU 
members. As long as the members of the EU chair remain 
participants in the SDR Department and observe the 
obligations of participants, they could keep the previ-
ously allocated SDR. However, in view of these members’ 
strong foreign reserve position, other possibilities could 
be envisaged such as straightforward cancellation of 
the allocations, their partial or total donation to poorer 
economies  (11), or measures to increase the liquidity of the 
SDR market (such as the conclusion of two-way arrange-
ments with the IMF).
4.  Implications for the governance of 
the IMF
4.1  Decision-making process at the IMF
A single EU chair at the IMF will have important political 
implications. It will obviously affect the composition of the 
Executive Board. Moreover, changes to the quotas of IMF 
members and thus their voting power will also affect the 
political governance of the IMF.
4.1.1  Changes in the composition of the IMF Executive 
Board
Article XII Section 3b of the IMF Articles of Agreement 
provides for 5 appointed and 15 elected EDs for the IMF 
Executive Board.
The 5 IMF members with the largest quota each appoint one 
ED representing their country. At the present time, these are 
the EDs of the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK. With 
a single EU chair, Europe would give up two appointed EDs. 
If we stick to the NCQS ranking, these could  be transferred 
to China and, surprisingly, Singapore  (12), whereas the actual 
quotas would rank Saudi Arabia fourth and China and 
(7)  The UK still ranks eighth, even if these nominal ﬁ  gures do not take inﬂ  ation into 
account. Moreover, IMF ﬁ  nancing has sharply increased in the late nineties with 
large ﬁ  nancing packages for emerging markets.
(8)  The fourth amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement provides for a special 
one-off allocation of SDR 21.4 billion to correct the fact that many members have 
never received SDR (more than one-ﬁ  fth of the current IMF members) or have not 
participated in all the allocations made. This amendment was approved by the IMF 
Board of Governors in 1997 but cannot take effect until it has been ratiﬁ  ed by the 
US Congress, as the ratiﬁ  cation by 123 members representing 73.74 p.c. of total 
voting power is not yet enough for implementation.
(9)  For comparison, the net cumulative allocation of the US amounts to SDR 4.9 billion 
(22.8 p.c. of total allocation).
(10) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, ECB, Finland, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Venezuela.
(11) In accordance with Article XIX, Section 2(c), the Fund prescribes that a participant, 
by agreement with another participant, may donate SDR to the other participant 
and inform the Fund of the amount of SDR and the value date for the transfer.
(12)  Thanks to its very open economy and strong economic growth, Singapore has 
a large calculated quota. Since Italy and the Netherlands would no longer be 
separate members, Singapore could, depending on the future development of its 
economy, even rank ﬁ  fth. According to 1999 ﬁ  gures, its economy almost matches 
Canada. With GDP and current account growing faster for Singapore, this 





































































































CHART 1  TOP 12 IMF BORROWERS, 1947-2001 (CUMULATIVE 
NOMINAL DRAWINGS; BILLION SDR)
Source : IMF.180
Canada ex aequo ﬁ  fth (Box 1). Such transfer would be wel-
comed by critics who claim that Europe is over-represented 
vis-à-vis emerging markets.
Alternatively, the number of appointed EDs could be 
cut, by changing Article XII. A reduction could indeed be 
appropriate in view of the gap in voting power between 
the EU/US, and the country ranking third.
As to the number of elected EDs, the Board of Governors 
may, by an 85 p.c. majority, reduce or increase it. At the 
moment, there are 19 elected EDs. Four of them are EU 
representatives :  the  Nordic (13), the Belgian, the Dutch and 
the Italian ED. They represent 4  constituencies totalling 
37 countries altogether. For the moment, there are 10 EU 
countries in these 4 constituencies, but by the time a single 
EU chair becomes reality, there may be up to 12 more  : all 
current acceding and accession countries except Poland  (14). 
The creation of a single EU chair would require a resched-
uling of these constituencies. 15  countries would need 
to change places  (15); they might either become members 
of existing constituencies, or form new constituencies. In 
the process, the total number of constituencies could be 
reduced. Alternatively, one or two additional EDs could be 
made available to the rest of the membership, in particular 
to the less well represented developing countries.
4.1.2  The decline of mixed constituencies
Mainly for political reasons, Saudi Arabia, China and 
Russia elect an ED who only represents his own country. 
16 EDs are elected by constituencies of several countries. 
Some of these multi-country constituencies are very 
homogeneous, while others are much more heterogene-
ous : the so-called mixed constituencies.
Mixed constituencies have an important role in the 
governance of the IMF. They fulﬁ   l a bridge function 
between the interests of rich and poor, industrialised 
and less-developed, northern and southern countries, 
creditors and debtors. Their Executive Director has to 
take into account the interests of all member countries 
of his constituency and, depending on their importance 
and involvement in the issue at stake and on the inter-
nal governance mechanisms of his constituency, he will 
have to make up his mind and express the opinion of 
his authorities. The consensus built within his constitu-
ency may already prepare or preﬁ  gure a consensus in 
the Board, since the different interests within the 
Executive Board may be represented, on a smaller scale, 
within the constituency.
The heterogeneous composition of mixed constitu-
encies may occasionally also push the EDs of these 
constituencies to a more neutral and technical stance. 
This was illustrated at the approval of Mexico’s 
Stand-By Arrangement in February  1995  (16) or at the 
recent Board decision on Argentina (January  2003), 
(13) Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland rotate in the election of their ED. 
Sometimes, a non-EU ED thus represents the constituency.
(14) Poland is a member of the Swiss constituency.
(15) These are Belarus and Kazakhstan from the Belgian constituency; Armenia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Israel, FRY Macedonia, Moldova and Ukraine from 
the Dutch constituency; Iceland and Norway from the Scandinavian constituency; 
Albania, Timor-Leste and San Marino in the Italian constituency.
What are Mixed Constituencies ?
There is no clear deﬁ  nition or exact list of mixed constituencies. Authors usually refer to constituencies including 
countries with different interests. Some mention geographical or economic criteria while others vaguely refer to 
the creditor-debtor distinction. In the table hereunder we attempt to classify mixed constituencies according to 
different criteria.
A ﬁ  rst criterion consists in a comparison of GDP of the countries within a constituency. GDP pro capita ﬁ  gures 
offer a more accurate reﬂ  ection of the heterogeneity of economic development than absolute GDP ﬁ  gures, as the 
latter depend too much on the population size of the member countries of a constituency. A constituency with 
one large country and several small countries may then be classiﬁ  ed as mixed while it may be economically homo-
geneous. Measuring the relative deviation of GDP pro capita within constituencies (ﬁ  rst column of the table), the 
Australian (Australia versus the others), Belgian (Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg versus the others), Dutch (the 
Netherlands versus the others), Indonesian (Singapore and Brunei Darussalam versus the others), Spanish (Spain 
versus Latin America), Sub-Saharan and Swiss (Switzerland versus Central and Eastern Europe) constituencies can 
be considered as mixed. Although the two Sub-Saharan constituencies do only comprise economically poor coun-
tries, they are still heterogeneous because the GDP pro capita differences between the poor and very poor remain 
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very substantial. The relatively strong growth of countries like Gabon and Mauritius, for instance, is a major factor 
in the economic heterogeneity of the French-speaking African constituency.
Secondly, dividing the world in broad geographical terms, we could classify the following constituencies as mixed : 
the Australian, Belgian, Canadian, Dutch, Indonesian and Swiss constituencies.
Eventually, as third criterion we could consider the creditor-debtor status of the member countries. This criterion 
provides the truest reﬂ  ection of a country’s IMF status : creditor and debtor countries have very different interests in 
the IMF. We deﬁ  ne debtors as countries that used IMF resources during a ten years time-span (1992-2001). There 
were, of course, many more countries that were debtors between 1992 and 2001 than exclusively in 2001. But a 
ten-year analysis takes greater account of the vulnerability/fragility of lenders  (1). Under this criterion only one (the 
French-speaking African) constituency is entirely homogeneous. All other constituencies include both debtor and 
creditor countries. We hence ﬁ  x a threshold and deﬁ  ne constituencies with at least 75 p.c. debtors or creditors as 
homogeneous constituencies. Using this criterion, the Australian, Belgian, Canadian, Indonesian, Italian and Nordic 
constituencies can be considered as mixed constituencies.
HETEROGENEITY OF MULTI-COUNTRY CONSTITUENCIES
Source: GDP pro capita (World Bank 2001) and Debtor ratio (IMF 1992-2001).
(1) Standard deviation within the constituency of GDP pro capita is divided by GDP pro capita average of constituency.
(2) Share of debtor countries between 1992 and 2001 in the constituency.






Indian  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3859 75 India and 3 neighbouring countries
Iranian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5514 83 Iran, Ghana, Pakistan and 3 Maghreb countries
Brazilian   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6723 78 Brazil and 8 Latin-American countries
Argentinian  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6905 83 Argentina and 5 South-American countries
Nordic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7397 38 5 Scandinavian and 3 Baltic countries
Italian   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7859 33 Italy, Greece, Portugal, Albania, San Marino 
and Timor-Leste
Canadian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8718 Mixed 58 Canada, Ireland and 10 Caribbean countries
Egyptian   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9622 23 Egypt, Maldives and 11 Arab countries
Belgian   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1683 Mixed 70 Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan
Australian  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2592 Mixed 43 Australia, Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, 
the Philippines and 9 Pacific countries
Spanish  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3038 75 Spain, Mexico, Venezuela 
and 5 Central-American countries
English-speaking African  . . . 1.3991 76 South Africa, Nigeria and 19 mainly 
English-speaking African countries
French-speaking African  . . . 1.4077 100 23 mainly French-speaking African countries
Dutch   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4749 Mixed 83 Netherlands, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, Israel, 
3 Balkan and 4 CIS countries
Indonesian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6492 Mixed 58 Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, 
6 Asian and 2 Pacific countries
Swiss  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3325 Mixed 75 Switzerland, Poland and 5 CIS countries
(1)  However, there is also a negative bias with a 10-year time span. A country that was an IMF debtor 10 years ago, such as Chile, may have become very sound and even 
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where EDs of mixed constituencies abstained. Mixed 
constituencies thereby may contribute to balance politi-
cal positions within the IMF.
In several cases, the EDs of mixed constituencies have 
played a decisive role in striking a balance between the 
interests of industrial countries and developing coun-
tries. While sharing industrial countries’ views on many 
issues, they have also often taken the same position 
as developing countries, and even helped to outvote 
industrial countries. For instance, during the 2000 
Review of Fund facilities, several mixed constituencies 
supported the EDs of developing countries in resisting 
an increase in the rate of charge  (17) advocated by the 
G7.
In the end, mixed constituencies may often be a better 
mouthpiece for developing countries than constituencies 
of less-developed countries, as the inﬂ  uence of the former 
generally is much higher.
The creation of a single EU chair at the IMF would greatly 
reduce the number of mixed constituencies. According to 
economic, geographic and debtor-creditor criteria, an EU 
constituency would be a homogeneous constituency (18). 
There would thus be fewer institutional bridges between 
industrialised European countries and other countries at 
different levels of development.
4.1.3  Growing political importance of the EU
In 1958, when the European Economic Community was 
established, its 6  founding members held 15.75  p.c. of 
total IMF voting power, while the US held 25.78 p.c. Up to 
now, the aggregated quota share of the EU members has 
been growing  : not only has the number of Union mem-
bers risen to 15 (and will shortly total at least 25), but their 
overall share in the world economy, and thus their calcu-
lated quota, has also increased. The growth in the number 
of IMF members (from 45 to 184) is the main reason why 
the share of the US has decreased to today’s 17.4 p.c. 
(Chart 2). With this share, the US nevertheless remains 
the only member with a veto right (for 85 p.c. majority 
votes  (19)) and by far the largest member (almost three 
times bigger than the next largest). The nation’s political 
and economic power obviously reinforces this position. 
Moreover, since the IMF headquarters are located in the 
territory of the member having the largest quota, US 
ideas and opinions are relatively inﬂ  uential because they 
are close at hand. In practice, the single US position at the 
IMF was only seldom confronted with a strong and single 
European voice. However, helped by shared values and 
reenforced coordination mechanisms since the advent of 
EMU, EU countries increasingly ﬁ   nd themselves on the 
same side on essential issues, such as the establishment 
of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism.
A scenario in which a single EU chair would inherit the 
actual quotas of the EU membership and thus have a 
veto power for 70 p.c. majority votes  (20) may not seem 
very plausible from a political point of view. Since the 
economic data relevant for quota calculations are very 
similar for the US and the EU, there are objective argu-
ments in favour of convergence of the actual quotas of 
the two chairs. The quota for the EU chair could hence 
be signiﬁ  cantly below the sum of the actual quotas of 
the EU member states. One element in the forthcoming 
- ultimately political - discussion might nevertheless be 
the observation that, in the process, Europe would stand 
ready to give up 6 of its current 7 EDs.
An interesting paradox in this ﬁ  eld is that a reduction 
in the number of European EDs, in the global voting 
power of Europe and in its contribution to the Fund’s 
general resources (as explained in chapter 3), could go 
hand in hand with an increase in the Union’s impact on 
IMF decision-making. A single EU chair would indeed 
have both the power to veto important decisions, and 
substantial constructive power to foster decisions. Leech 
(2002) illustrates this by calculating power indices for 
IMF members. His results prove that for ordinary IMF 
decisions requiring a 50 p.c. majority, the US currently 
has political power far in excess of its voting weight, 
since it does not need many other members to form a 
winning coalition. According to such indices, a single 
EU chair would have more power than the EU members 
taken together.
Note that adapting actual quotas towards calculated 
quotas for the entire Fund membership might go against 
the current trend of strengthening the voices of the 
low-income countries. One way of compensating for this 
might be to increase the basic votes, i.e. the number of 
voting rights each Fund member automatically receives, 
regardless of its quota.
(16) See Van Houtven (2002).
(17) See Van Houtven (2002).
(18) With 25 countries, the EU would have a GDP pro capita relative deviation of 0.66 
and a debtor ratio of 8 p.c. With 28 countries, these indices would be respectively 
0.76 and 18 p.c.
(19) An 85 p.c. majority is required in 16 categories of decision, such as adjustment of 
quotas and votes, provisions for general exchange arrangements, allocation and 
cancellation of SDR and amendments to the Agreement.
(20) A 70 p.c. majority is required for many ﬁ  nancial and operational decisions and the 
suspension of voting rights.183
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4.1.4  Increased polarisation of the IMF 
 governance
The creation of a single EU chair would drastically change 
the balance of power at the IMF. There would be two large 
blocks : the EU chair and the US, each with a veto power 
for 85 p.c. majority votes. But together they would also 
be able to veto 70 p.c. majority decisions. And for simple 
majority decisions (50 p.c.), an alliance of Japan, Europe 
and the US would be sufﬁ  cient. In order to obtain IMF 
ﬁ  nancing, a member country will automatically have to 
convince the two main members. Once both chairs agree 
on a speciﬁ  c issue, it would be difﬁ  cult to go against or 
block their agreement. It however remains a moot point 
whether in real life a Fund with two main players would 
function better than under the now prevailing structure.
At the current juncture, there is already a tendency towards 
creditor/debtor polarisation in IMF governance. The decline 
of mixed constituencies and the importance of the two 
largest members might further impair the co-operative 
nature of the IMF, which risks becoming a forum opposing 
creditors to debtors, where minority debtors can ask for 
ﬁ  nancing. Although the IMF at its origin was a co-operative 
where a country could be a creditor one year and a debtor 
another year, creditor and debtor countries have become 
two more clearly distinctive categories. The diversity of 
interests of EU countries, the functioning of mixed constitu-
encies, and – more recently – the element of “peer review”
in surveillance and ﬁ   nancial sector assessment activities,   
nevertheless still favour the co-operative nature of the 
IMF. The creation of a single EU chair with a clear, single 
European position and the waning importance of mixed 
constituencies it entails would affect this co-operative 
nature. However, much will depend on the positions taken 
by the EU chair. The internal decision-making process of the 
EU will therefore be very important.
4.2  Impact of internal EU governance on the IMF
The implications of the introduction of a single EU chair 
will depend very much on the internal governance of the 
EU. Speciﬁ  c mechanisms will have to be set up to operate, 
at the more technical level, the duties and rights of an EU 
chair at the IMF and to establish, at the political level, the 
European positions. These mechanisms would function   
either or not within the broader framework of a common 
European foreign policy.
Currently, the European Commission and the ECB have 
observer status at the IMF; the former however only at 
the International Monetary and Financial Committee, the 
latter at the Executive Board as well. Voting power lies 
entirely with the EU countries, the Fund remaining at the 
current stage a country-based institution. Nevertheless, 
co-ordination is increasing, both at a technical level 
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as well as in Washington) and at the political level (in par-
ticular through the informal ECOFIN Council meetings).
A situation in which all EU countries would gather in 
one constituency (or a membership similar to that of the 
United Arab Republic) would less strongly affect the rights 
and duties of the countries concerned. Each EU member 
state would remain a member of the Fund individually, but 
Europe would have to speak with one voice, and to cast a 
single vote. The decision-making process in the constitu-
ency would be based mainly on a confrontation of national 
interests of the members, as is already the case in multi-
country constituencies. A major difference in relation to 
the currently prevailing situation of increased co-ordination 
would be the need for an ex-ante commitment to reaching 
a common view, as an ED can only take one position. No 
changes would be necessary as to IMF ﬁ  nancing, which 
could continue to be a matter of national competence.
When the EU, in another scenario, would become a “fully 
ﬂ  edged” single member of the Fund, it would obviously 
inherit the duties and rights of the actual European IMF 
member states. This would have more far-reaching impli-
cations. The single EU member would contribute to IMF 
ﬁ  nancing according to its quota. Equally, since the IMF 
only deals with its members and not with sub-entities, 
the Fund would exert surveillance under Article IV of 
the Articles of Agreement over the European Union as a 
whole, and could no longer eventually provide ﬁ  nancing 
to individual member states of the Union.
Whether a single chair will be introduced, and which 
positions it will take in IMF decision-making, will largely 
depend on the progress made in the uniﬁ  cation  of 
foreign policies. If the European Union succeeds in 
formulating a common foreign policy, in addition to a 
common monetary policy, a single EU membership at 
the Fund would become inevitable. In such a situation, 
and obviously depending on the clarity of the common 
foreign policy, all conditions would be present for the 
European chair to be able to deﬁ  ne and defend clear-cut 
positions.
However, if the EU were to opt for a single member-
ship before foreign policy is uniﬁ   ed, EU positions at 
the IMF would risk to become either watered down, 
or largely technocratic. The co-ordination of national 
positions would indeed be a cumbersome process, 
the outcome of which would risk being compromises 
reﬂ   ecting the largest common denominator between 
still highly differing political views of member states. If 
and when IMF position-taking would be left to a more 
or less independent institution of the Union, a factor 
for tensions within the Union and between the Union 
and its member states would be built into the system, 
while at the same time the accountability of the Fund 
could suffer.
The link between EU and IMF governance obviously is a 
two-way relationship. The Union’s internal organisation with 
regard to its single chair at the Fund will indeed undoubtedly 
be inﬂ  uenced by the degree to which the IMF will be a rules-
based institution, providing a clear and transparent frame-
work for decision taking, with well-deﬁ  ned objectives and 
proper accountability. The higher the degree of discretion in 
managing the Fund, the more difﬁ  cult it could be to organise 
a well-functioning EU chair, able to reach well-deﬁ  ned posi-
tions within the often required short time-span.
5. Legal  feasibility
The introduction of a single EU chair will require legal adap-
tations at different levels  : the IMF Articles of Agreement, 
the European Treaties and, in many countries, domestic 
legislation will have to be amended. Moreover, legal settle-
ments between the IMF and the EU member countries will 
be needed in order to solve speciﬁ  c transition problems.
The Fund’s Articles of Agreement deﬁ   ne the duties 
and rights of IMF members. Including monetary unions 
alongside countries in the deﬁ  nition of possible members 
of the IMF (Article II) could be a promising avenue for 
establishing a single, fully-ﬂ  edged EU membership. The at 
ﬁ  rst sight less complex creation of a single European con-
stituency would also require amendments to the Articles 
of Agreement, mainly regarding the composition of the 
Executive Board. Article XII, for instance, does not allow 
the ﬁ  ve largest members to join a constituency. As for the 
settlement of speciﬁ  c transition problems, Schedule J of 
the Articles of Agreement, ruling settlements of accounts 
with members withdrawing, and its application in cases 
like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Cuba or Indonesia, could 
provide some valuable insights.
Amendments to the EU Treaty may also be necessary to 
adapt internal governance mechanisms if the EU becomes 
a single member of the IMF. An interesting precedent in 
this ﬁ  eld is the European representation within the World 
Trade Organisation.185
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Legal considerations on differences in EC external representation :
World Trade Organisation versus international ﬁ  nancial institutions
Although their subject is different, Articles 111 and 133 of the EC Treaty have a very similar construction. On 
the one hand, Article 111 indicates the way to conclude agreements on an exchange-rate system for the euro 
in relation to non-EC currencies (or to formulate the general stance of exchange-rate policy in relation to these 
currencies), determines which EC body decides (under what conditions) on the arrangements for the negotiation 
and conclusion of such agreements, and which body decides (under what conditions) on the position of the EC 
at international level as regards issues of particular relevance to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and on its 
external representation. On the other hand, Article 133 indicates the way to conclude international trade agree-
ments and determines which body decides (under what conditions) the arrangements for the negotiation and for 
the conclusion of such agreements.
Article 111
1. [...], the Council may, acting unanimously on 
a recommendation from the ECB or from the 
Commission, and after consulting the ECB [...], 
after consulting the European Parliament [...], 
conclude formal agreements on an exchange-
rate system for the [euro] in relation to non-
Community currencies [...].
2. [...], the Council, acting by a qualiﬁ  ed  majority 
either on a recommendation from the Commission 
and after consulting the ECB or on a recommenda-
tion from the ECB, may formulate general orienta-
tions for exchange-rate policy in relation to these 
currencies […].
3. […], the Council, acting by a qualiﬁ  ed majority 
on a recommendation from the Commission and 
after consulting the ECB, shall decide the arrange-
ments for the negotiation and for the conclusion 
of agreements [concerning monetary or foreign-
exchange regime matters]. These arrangements 
shall ensure that the Community expresses a 
single position. The Commission shall be fully 
associated with the negotiations […].
4. […], the Council, acting by a qualiﬁ  ed majority 
on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the ECB, shall decide on the position 
of the Community at international level as regards 
issues of particular relevance to economic and 
monetary union and on its representation, […].
5. Without prejudice to Community competence 
and Community agreements as regards economic 
and monetary union, Member States may negoti-
ate in international bodies and conclude interna-
tional agreements.
Article 133
1. The common commercial policy shall be based on 
uniform principles, particularly in regard to […] the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, […].
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the 
Council for implementing the common commer-
cial policy.
3. Where agreements with one or more States or 
international organisations need to be negotiated, 
the Commission shall make recommendations to 
the Council, which shall authorise the Commission 
to open the necessary negotiations […].
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in 
consultation with a special committee appointed 
by the Council […]
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by 
this Article, the Council shall act by a qualiﬁ  ed 
majority.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall also apply to the negotia-
tion and conclusion of agreements in the ﬁ  elds of 
trade in services and the commercial aspects of 
intellectual property, […].
This paragraph shall not affect the right of the 
Member States to maintain and conclude agree-
ments with third countries or international organi-
sations in so far as such agreements comply with 
Community law and other relevant international 
agreements […].
Box 3186
6.  Potential implications for other 
international economic and 
ﬁ  nancial organisations
The creation of a single EU chair at the IMF would also affect 
other international economic and ﬁ   nancial fora, and the 
global external representation of the EU countries. Apart 
from the IMF, there is a vast array of international group-
ings where EU countries are represented. The composition 
of these groups varies. In some of them, the European voice 
is already present via the European Commission and/or the 
ECB. In others, only some European countries are repre-
sented (Chart 3). The creation of a single EU chair at the IMF 
might be coupled with a review of how EU countries are 
represented in the other international ﬁ  nancial spheres.
The creation of a single EU chair at the IMF would in all 
probability inﬂ  uence the governance of the World Bank. 
Should a single EU seat at the IMF also give rise to a single 
representation at the World Bank? Such a move might be 
facilitated by the relative similarity between the govern-
ance of the two institutions (the constituencies are identi-
cal, and their voting power very similar). In addition, the 
Bank and the Fund already collaborate closely on country 
programs and conditionality. On the other hand, it would 
probably be difﬁ  cult to establish a single European posi-
tion at the World Bank, in view of the often highly politi-
cal development issues handled by this institution.
Given the strong parallelism between the two articles, the question arises how it can be that, in one case, the EC 
membership of the WTO is based on Article 133 whereas, in the other case, Article 111 did not (yet?) lead to a 
single EC membership of international organisations such as the IMF.
There are two complementary reasons for this seemingly inconsistent approach. First, these articles cover 
very different subjects  : common commercial policy (Article 133) is (with limited exceptions) an EC exclusive 
competence  (1) while issues of particular relevance to EMU  (2) are either EC exclusive competences, shared 
competences, or Member States’ exclusive competences.
Second, Article 133 says nothing about EC membership of any international trade organisation. For a very under-
standable reason : at the time Article 133 was adopted (1957, Treaty of Rome), no such organisation existed (the 
question of establishing the WTO was not raised until the Uruguay Round, 1986-1994); there were only interna-
tional trade negotiations (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - GATT). The European Commission justiﬁ  ed 
an EC membership in the WTO on the legal basis of Article 133. Before the Uruguay Round, disagreements on 
several topics were so insurmountable in the Council that negotiation directives given to the Commission were very 
broad and imprecise (as they were common denominator compromises). The Commission, combining these direc-
tives and the EC exclusive competence on common commercial policy, gained acceptance for the idea of an EC 
membership of the WTO. At the conclusion of the negotiations, this membership was conﬁ  rmed by the Council, in 
the package deal constituted by WTO agreements (GATT, GATS or General Agreement on Trade in Services, etc.). 
Conversely, in the case of pre-existing international organisations such as the IMF, an evolution of the kind on 
the basis of Article 111 did not materialise. This article was indeed only inserted into the Treaty (1993, Treaty of 
Maastricht) long after the creation of these organisations.
For these two reasons, a single EC membership in organisations such as the IMF will necessitate several important 
amendments to the EC Treaty. Some people - Louis (2001) – have suggested an easy solution  : an adaptation of 
Article 111, which could explicitly allow the single representation of the EC in international institutions. This adap-
tation could also conceivably be supplemented by speciﬁ  c rules determining internal EC governance and policy 
guidelines, as well as the allocation of tasks between the ECB, the Commission and possibly other EC or Member 
States bodies. However, it would probably not be sufﬁ  cient to amend only this article of the EC Treaty, as this would 
not change the allocation of powers between the EC and its Member States. Indeed, a single EC representation 
would be difﬁ  cult to imagine as long as Member States still have exclusive powers in some areas within the ﬁ  eld 
of competence of the IMF.
 (1) As conﬁ  rmed by the European Community Court of Justice (case 22/70 (AETR), judgment of 31 March 1971, ECR., p.263; case 1/94, opinion of 15 November 1994, 
ECR, §44).
 (2) E.g. in IMF matters: surveillance under Article IV over the common monetary and exchange rate policies of the euro area, surveillance under Article IV over the policies 
of individual euro area members, role of the euro in the international monetary system, world economic outlook, international capital markets reports, and world 
economic and markets developments.187
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The consequences of the single EU chair at the Fund 
will probably be quite noticeable within the G7. The 
G7  has a decisive inﬂ   uence on IMF decision-making, 
and the Managing Director of the Fund usually partici-
pates, by invitation, in the surveillance discussions of 
the G7 (or G8) ﬁ  nance ministers and central bank gov-
ernors. The EU already participates in the G7 (Chart 3). 
If the EU countries start speaking with one voice within 
this group, a single European representation could 
replace the current EU member states’ representatives. 
This group would hence become a group of four, with 
the EU and the US as major participants. The govern-
ance of the IMF with its two major blocks, the EU and 
the US, would thereby closely resemble the governance 
of the G7.
Similarly to the G7, the eleven participants to the 
General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) - which also 
constitute the G10  - or the twenty-six participants 
of the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) are also 
selected groups of ﬁ   nancially strong industrial coun-
tries (or their central banks). In the case of a single 
external European representation, the composition of 
the G10  and the G7  would become very similar (the 
only difference being the presence of Switzerland in 
the G10).
The number and impact of international institutions and 
fora, which moreover often cover considerable other ﬁ  elds 
in addition to mere ﬁ  nancial and economic issues, again 
point to the complexity of a streamlining of the European 
Union’s representation, the far-reaching consequences a 
single EU chair would entail, and the quasi inextricable 
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